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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7367

RUFHST/USDEL SALT II 82

RUESHL/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 478

RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2500

BT

UNCLAS SECTION 1 *thru of Three* 3 BONN 15918

HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL -- GENEVA DISTO

SUBJ: SALT: NAA SPEECH BY SENATOR JACKSON

SUMMARY

1. GERMAN MEDIA (AND OFFICIALS) HAVE GIVEN WIDE ATTENTION TO SPEECH ENTITLED "CREDIBLE DETERRENCE IN A SALT II ENVIRONMENT", WHICH U.S. SENATOR HENRY JACKSON GAVE NOV 21 TO NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY MILITARY COMMITTEE. JACKSON'S SPEECH WAS CRITICAL

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OF USG FOR "LACK OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINE", OVEREMPHASIS IN SALT-I
ON NEGOTIABILITY VIZ ESSENTIAL NATIONAL INTERESTS AND ALLEGED
US RELIANCE ON POLICY OF "MINIMUM DETERRENCE". JACKSON CALLED
ON NATO ALLIES TO "OFFER MORE EXTENSIVE COUNSEL" IN SALT-II
TO ASSURE THEIR INTERESTS IN STRATEGIC BALANCE, ADDING THAT
THOSE INTERESTS EXTEND BEYOND FBS TYPE ISSUES. TEXT FOLLOWS.
END SUMMARY.

2. BEGIN TEXT

BASIC LESSONS OF SALT I

THERE ARE, IN MY VIEW, THREE FUNDAMENTAL LESSONS OF SALT I THAT
ARISE OUT OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN HELSINKI AND VIENNA.
THE ISSUES THEY INVOLVE SHOULD BE HIGH ON THE AGENDA OF NATO
CONSULTATION.

3. 1. THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

THE UNITED STATES, IN CONSULTATION WITH ITS ALLIANCE PARTNERS,
MUST DEVELOP A COHERENT STRATEGIC DOCTRINE BASED ON A SET OF
OBJECTIVES UNDERSTOOD IN THE WEST AND COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY
TO THE EAST. WE DO NOT NOW HAVE ONE. EVEN WITHOUT CONTINUING
ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS WE WOULD NEED, IN THE UNITED STATES AND
WITHIN NATO, TO REFORMULATE FUNDAMENTAL NUCLEAR STRATEGIC OBJEC-
TIVES TO TAKE REALISTIC ACCOUNT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY GROWTH OF
SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES THAT FIRST SET THE STAGE FOR AND THEN
WERE CONFIRMED BY THE MOSCOW ACCORDS OF LAST MAY. BUT PRECISELY
BECAUSE WE ARE CONTINUING THE STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, THE
NEED FOR A CAREFUL FORMULATION OF DOCTRINE AND OBJECTIVES REMAINS
IMPORTANT. WITHOUT IT WE HAVE NO CAREFUL, RELIABLE MEANS OF
MEASURING THE WISDOM OF THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS THAT ARE UNDER
CONSIDERATION, WE HAVE NO GUIDELINES BY WHICH TO TAKE ACCOUNT
OF THE ATTITUDES OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND WE HAVE NO BASIS
FOR RESPONDING TO THE VARIOUS POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE SOVIET
UNION.

4. WHEN I SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES TODAY LACKS A COHERENT STRATEGIC
DOCTRINE, I DO NOT MEAN THAT AMERICA LACKS IDEAS ABOUT THE NATURE
AND PURPOSES OF ITS STRATEGIC FORCES, BUT, RATHER, THAT WE HAVE
SEVERAL SUCH NOTIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE IN CONFLICT WITH OTHERS.
FOR EXAMPLE, WE SEEM, ON THE ONE HAND, TO HOLD TO THE VIEW THAT
AMERICA'S EUROPEAN ALLIES SHOULD RELY ON THE U.S. STRATEGIC DETERRENT

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TO PROTECT THEM FROM SOVIET THREATS AND INTIMIDATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, OUR ARMS CONTROL POLICIES -- AND THE EXPLICIT PRONOUNCEMENTS OF MANY AMERICAN SPECIALISTS AND DIPLOMATS -- APPEAR TO BE BASED ON AN EXTREME CONCEPT OF MINIMUM DETERRENCE THAT WOULD LIMIT THE ROLE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE TO THE STRIKING OF RUSSIAN CITIES IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT ATTACK AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES. CLEARLY SUCH A DOCTRINE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF EXTENDING THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR GUARANTEE TO OUR NATO PARTNERS AND MARKS A DEPARTURE FROM LONGSTANDING ALLIANCE POLICY. WHAT MAKES THIS DOCTRINAL INCONSISTENCY BOTH REAL AND IMPORTANT IS THE GROWING AWARENESS, ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC, THAT THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, WHICH IS INCREASINGLY ADVERSE TO THE UNITED STATES, LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR AN ALTERNATIVE AMERICAN STRATEGIC POSTURE.

5. MANY AMERICAN SPOKESMEN, AND SOME EUROPEANS, HAVE TRIED TO DERIVE NOT ONLY AN AMERICAN, BUT ALSO A SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, BY INTERPRETING WHAT THEY PRESUME TO BE THE "LOGIC" OF THE SALT I ACCORDS. ACCORDING TO THIS VIEW BOTH COUNTRIES, IN SUBSCRIBING THE ABM TREATY, HAVE IN EFFECT "AGREED" TO REMAIN VULNERABLE TO A RETALIATORY ATTACK THEREBY ASSURING THAT EVEN QUITE SMALL DETERRENT FORCES WILL BE ADEQUATE TO DETER. THE LOGIC OF THIS INTERPRETATION ESCAPES ME. FIRST, IT FAILS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE MASSIVE SOVIET AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. FOR ANOTHER, IT IGNORES THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE: THE CERTAIN SURVIVABILITY OF ONE'S RETALIATORY FORCE. THE FACT THAT WE WILL NOT HAVE TO CONTEND WITH SOPHISTICATED ABM SYSTEMS IS NOT IN ITSELF A GUARANTEE THAT ENOUGH OF OUR NUCLEAR FORCE COULD SURVIVE ATTACK TO ASSURE RETALIATION. FINALLY, IT SEEMS TO ME FAR MORE PLAUSIBLE TO EXPLAIN SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE ABM TREATY AS AN EFFORT TO STOP THE UNITED STATES FROM CONTINUING WITH ITS MUCH MORE ADVANCED ABM DEPLOYMENT AT A MOMENT WHEN COMPARABLE TECHNOLOGY WAS UNAVAILABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE LAST THING I WOULD READ INTO THE ABM TREATY IS THE OTHERWISE UNSUPPORTED NOTION THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED THE DOCTRINE OF MINIMUM DETERRENCE AS IT IS UNDERSTOOD BY SOME OF OUR OWN ARMS CONTROL SPECIALISTS.

6. I WANT TO TAKE A MOMENT TO REFLECT ON THE MINIMUM DETERRENCE DOCTRINE BECAUSE I AM CONCERNED THAT, IN THE VACUUM CREATED BY OUR FAILURE TO IDENTIFY AND PURSUE A COHERENT STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, IT WILL COME TO DOMINATE OUR THOUGHT ABOUT STRATEGY JUST AS IT HAS ALREADY COME TO DOMINATE MUCH OF OUR THOUGHT ABOUT

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ARMS CONTROL. ACCORDING TO THIS DOCTRINE ALL THAT IS NECESSARY FOR A POLICY OF STABLE DETERRENCE IS TO MAINTAIN A CAPABILITY TO DESTROY SOME FINITE PERCENTAGE OF THE ADVERSARY'S CITIES AND INDUSTRY IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT NUCLEAR ATTACK. TYPICALLY, THE PROPONENTS OF THIS VIEW CAN BE BROUGHT TO ADMIT THAT A SINGLE POSEIDON BOAT COULD, BY ITSELF, ASSURE THIS CAPABILITY AND THAT IT THEREFORE WOULD CONSTITUTE AN ADEQUATE U.S. DETERRENT FORCE. SOME AMERICAN SCIENTISTS HAVE GONE SO FAR AS TO ARGUE THAT A HANDFUL OF WEAPONS TARGETED ON A HANDFUL OF SOVIET CITIES CONSTITUTES STRATEGIC SUFFICIENCY. TO THOSE OF THIS PERSUASION THE SALT ACCORDS, DESPITE THEIR HAVING CONFERRED A 50 PERCENT ADVANTAGE IN NUMBERS OF ICBM'S AND SLBM'S ON THE SOVIETS, HAVE IN NO WAY DIMINISHED THE DETERRENT CAPABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

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RUFHST/USDEL SALT II 83

RUEHL/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 479

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UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 3 BONN 15918

HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL -- GENEVA DISTO

7. NEEDLESS TO SAY, MINIMUM DETERRENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COULD EASILY BE UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN NO DETERRENCE AT ALL FOR OUR ALLIES: FOR IF ALL THAT THE U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE CAN (OR SHOULD) DO IS EXECUTE A SALVO OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOLLOWING A SOVIET ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES, ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY WEIGHT WITH RESPECT TO DISCOURAGING SOVIET INTIMIDATION OF NATO WILL BE SLIGHT INDEED. BUT THAT IS NOT ALL. WHAT IS PERHAPS MOST DISTURBING ABOUT THE MINIMUM DETERRENCE DOCTRINE UNDER THE PRESENT

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AND EVOLVING STRATEGIC BALANCE IS THAT IT IS NOT CREDIBLE. THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT POSSESS SO MANY STRATEGIC WEAPONS AS TO CONTEMPLATE A COUNTERFORCE FIRST STRIKE WHICH WOULD EMPLOY BUT A FRACTION OF ITS TOTAL STRATEGIC FORCE. THIS COULD WELL LEAVE THE BULK OF ITS STRATEGIC FORCE FREE TO THREATEN THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CITIES SHOULD THE UNITED STATES ACTUALLY LAUNCH A RETALIATORY STRIKE IN RESPONSE TO THE INITIAL SOVIET ATTACK. SINCE IT IS DIFFICULT TO TAKE SERIOUSLY THE PROSPECT OF AMERICAN RETALIATION UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. DETERRENT CANNOT HELP BUT BECOME INCREASINGLY UNCERTAIN.

8. NOW, MINIMUM DETERRENCE IS THE ORTHODOXY OF THE ARMS CONTROL COMMUNITY THAT PLANNED AND NEGOTIATED THE AMERICAN SIDE OF THE MOSCOW ACCORDS. BUT IT NEED NOT BECOME THE BASIS OF OUR STRATEGIC DOCTRINE AND STILL LESS THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE OF OUR ALLIANCE PARTNERS. FOR THAT MATTER THERE IS, IN PRINCIPLE, NO REASON WHY MINIMUM DETERRENCE SHOULD PERSIST AS THE CENTRAL DOCTRINE UNDERLYING SALT II.

9. IT IS NOT MY PURPOSE HERE TO DEFINE AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC POSTURE FROM WHICH AN APPROACH TO SALT II MIGHT BE DERIVED, BUT MERELY TO ARGUE THAT DOING SO IS AN ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE TO INTELLIGENT NEGOTIATION. ON THE WHOLE I RATHER INCLINE TO THE VIEW THAT THE FIRST TASK OF SALT II MUST BE TO DESIGN A POSTURE THAT TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE LARGE SOVIET STRATEGIC RESERVE FORCE AND IMPOSES LIMITS THAT WOULD REDUCE THAT RESERVE. ONE SUCH LIMIT MIGHT INVOLVE A REDUCTION IN TOTAL THROW WEIGHT WHICH WOULD, IN TURN, LIMIT COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITIES. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TO ALLOW THE U.S. TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL SILO-DEFENDING ABM'S TO OFFSET SOVIET THROW WEIGHT ADVANTAGES. WE NEED TO FIND A MEANS OF COPING WITH STRATEGIC SCENARIOS IN WHICH THERE IS EVEN A SLIGHT POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT BE DETERRED FROM RETALIATING.

2. 10. STOP NEGOTIATING WITH OURSELVES

IN SALT I WE SPENT FAR TOO MUCH TIME NEGOTIATING WITH OURSELVES. THAT IS, WE TENDED TO ASSESS VARIOUS CONTROL PROPOSALS NOT IN TERMS OF SOME OVERALL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES BUT, RATHER, IN TERMS OF WHAT WE BELIEVED WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION. NEGOTIABILITY BECAME THE CENTRAL CRITERION BY WHICH MUCH OF WHAT WE THOUGHT AND PROPOSED AND PLANNED WAS EVALUATED. THIS IS FOOLISHNESS. THE ESSENCE OF NEGOTIATION IS THE RECONCILIATION

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OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS AND VALUES THROUGH ACCOMMODATION. THIS
REQUIRED THAT ONE ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITH POSITIONS WHICH, WHILE
UNACCEPTABLE IN THEIR ENTIRETY, CONTAIN ELEMENTS THAT CAN BE
REARRANGED, COMBINED AND MODERATED IN THE SEARCH FOR AN AGREEMENT,
AND TO THE EXTENT THAT ACCOMMODATION IS RECIPROCATED. TO DISCARD
IN ADVANCE PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE MERITORIOUS BUT BELIEVED TO BE
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER SIDE IS TO ABANDON THE EFFORT TO PERSUADE
THE ADVERSARY OF THE WISDOM OF ONE'S POSITION -- TO SAY NOTHING
OF ABANDONING THE EFFORT TO INFLUENCE. I AM HOPEFUL THAT
ENOUGH PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE SALT DELIBERATIONS HAVE BECOME AWARE
OF THE FOOLISHNESS OF FILTERING OUR OWN POSITIONS BEFORE PRESENTING
THEM AND THAT THIS WILL BE REMEDIED IN SALT II.

3. 11. WE NEED TO STAND FIRM

PARTLY BECAUSE OF OUR FAILURE TO DEFINE OUR OBJECTIVES CLEARLY,
AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE UNSEEMLY HAST THAT OVERCAME OUR EFFORTS
TO CONCLUDE THE MOSCOW ACCORDS IN AN ORDERLY FASHION, THE UNITED
STATES FAILED TO STAND FIRM IN SUPPORT OF ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION
ON A NUMBER OF KEY ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, WE DROPPED OUR INSISTENCE
ON THE RIGHT TO SUBSTITUTE SEA-BASED FOR LAND-BASED INTERCONTINEN-
TAL MISSILES AND WE FAILED TO OBTAIN A LOW CEILING ON THE OVERALL
NUMBER OF SOVIET LAUNCHERS. BOTH OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN PART OF
EARLIER U.S. PROPOSALS. INDEED, THERE IS ASTONISHINGLY LITTLE
RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN OUR EARLY PROPOSALS AND THE FINAL AGREEMENTS.
WHAT IS MORE, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT IF THE MAY 26 AGREEMENTS
HAD BEEN PROPOSED EARLY IN THE PREPARATION FOR THE TALKS THEY
WOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OUT OF HAND BY AMERICAN PLANNERS AS
CONCEDING TOO MUCH TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN POSITION IS ONE OF UNIMPEDED DETERIORATION.

12. ONE ISSUE ON WHICH WE DID STAND -- AND ABOUT WHICH I WILL
HAVE MORE TO SAY IN A MOMENT -- IS OUR VIEW OF THE MISSION OF
U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE. WE HAVE MAINTAINED THAT THESE FORCES,
DEDICATED TO THE DEFENSE OF OUR ALLIES, CANNOT BE CALCULATED IN
THE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC BALANCE. WE HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT THEY BE SO INCLUDED IS A POLITICAL
TACTIC DESIGNED TO SPLIT THE ALLIANCE.

13. I AM CONFIDENT THAT ON THIS ISSUE -- WITH YOUR HELP -- WE
CAN CONTINUE TO STAND FIRM THROUGHOUT SALT II AND THAT OUR CLEAR
AND UNEQUIVOCAL POSITION ON SO-CALLED FORWARD BASES WILL REMAIN
THE RULE RATHER THAN THE EXCEPTION.

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14. WHEN I SAY THAT WE NEED TO STAND FIRMIN SUPPORT OF OUR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS IN SALT II, I DO NOT MEAN THAT WE OUGHT TO BE RIGID AND UNYIELDING ON EVERY DETAIL. THERE MUST, OF NECESSITY, BE COMPROMISE AND ACCOMMODATION ON BOTH SIDES. WHAT I DO MEAN TO URGE IS THAT WE DEFINE OUR OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN ARMS CONTROL POLICIES THAT IMPLEMENT THEM AND PRESENT PROPOSALS BASED ON THEM AS FORCEFULLY AS POSSIBLE. ON THOSE MATTERS THAT ARE NOT ESSENTIAL FOR OUR SECURITY THERE CAN BE ADJUSTMENT AND ACCOMMODATION. ON ESSENTIALS WE MUST STAND FIRM. THE SOVIETS WILL RESPECT US FOR IT AND THE RESULTING AGREEMENTS WILL BE BETTER AND SAFER FOR IT.

SALT AND THE NATO ALLIANCE

15. FOR AS LONG AS THERE HAVE BEEN PARLAMENTARIAN MEETING SUCH AS THESE THERE HAVE BEEN EXPRESSIONS OF THE NEED FOR IMPROVED CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THIS MEETING WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY FOLLOW THE PATTERN OF OUR PREVIOUS MEETINGS IN THIS REGARD. AMONG ALLIES THERE CAN NEVER BE TOO MUCH CONSULTATION. GENERALLY THE THRUST OF THE CALL FOR GREATER CONSULTATION HAS CARRIED WITH IT THE SUGGESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO WELL TO LISTEN MORE AND TO PONDER WITH GREATER ATTENTIVENESS THE VIEWS OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. I HAVE OFTEN SHARED THIS VIEW.

16. THUS I WAS TROUBLED AND DISAPPOINTED TO OBSERVE HOW LITTLE SOLID ADVICE ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION MATTERS ORIGINATED WITH OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS DURING PHASE I OF SALT. I AM SORRY TO SAY THAT IN MY VIEW THERE WAS LITTLE SAID, AND LESS TO BE LEARNED, AS A RESULT OF THE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO SALT I.

17. WHAT IS PERHAPS MOST CURIOUS ABOUT THE SEEMING INATTENTION ON PART OF OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS TO THE COMPLEX ISSUES SURROUNDING SALT IS HOW DISPROPORTIONATE THIS IS TO THE STAKE THE ALLIANCE HAS IN THE OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR OUR FRIENDS IN EUROPE TO LIMIT THEIR CONCERN TO THAT PART OF THE SALT DISCUSSIONS WHICH INVOLVES U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES IN FORWARD AREAS, ALTHOUGH THAT IS CLEARLY A HIGH PRIORITY ISSUE FOR THE COUNTRIES WHICH HOST THE BASES AND ARE PROTECTED BY THEM. THE NATURE OF THE INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC BALANCE, THE PACE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY, THE RELATIVE THROW WEIGHT OF THE TWO STRATEGIC FORCES, THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE

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~~U.S. DETERRENT -- ALL THESE ISSUES INVOLVE THE EUROPEAN STRATEGIC~~
POINT OF VIEW, IT IS THE EUROPEAN-BASED DEPLOYMENT THAT IS OF
LEAST SIGNIFICANCE IN DETERMINING THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

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RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 811
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RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 4760
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 9508
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RUESHL/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 480
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UNCLAS SECTION 3 OF 3 BONN 15918

HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL -- GENEVA DISTO

18. I HOPE THAT IN THIS SECOND PHASE OF SALT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WILL FIND THE TIME AND INTEREST TO BRING THEIR GREAT TALENTS AND IMPORTANT PERSPECTIVE TO BEAR ON THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF THE EAST-WEST STRATEGIC BALANCE. THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE BENEFITTED GREATLY FROM THE WISE COUNSEL OF ITS NATO PARTNERS IN SALT I, NOT ONLY IN PROTECTING INTERESTS COMMONLY IDENTIFIED WITH NATO, BUT IN BROADENING OUR PERSPECTIVE ON SOME MORE GENERAL

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MATTERS AS WELL. I SUSPECT THAT THE TENDENCY OF ARMS CONTROL PLANNING TO SERVE MINIMUM DETERRENCE PERSPECTIVES WOULD HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED EARLIER AND WITH MORE INSISTENCE BY SOME ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WHO OUGHT TO APPRECIATE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEM OF SUCH A DOCTRINE AS THE BASIS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. MOREOVER, THERE IS A CRUCIAL ISSUE ON WHICH THE VIEW OF AMERICA'S NATO PARTNERS IS VITAL AND THAT IS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. I CAN WELL IMAGINE HOW VARIOUS AMERICAN SALT POSTURES MIGHT AFFECT THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCES, BUT IT IS FAR BETTER TO APPROACH SUCH QUESTIONS ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS RATHER THAN BY RESORTING TO GUESS WORK AND THEORETICAL MODELS.

19. WHAT I AM SAYING IS THAT SOME OF OUR MISTAKES IN SALT I MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAD REGARDED THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SUFFICIENT INTEREST AND HAD OFFERED MORE EXTENSIVE COUNSEL. BRIEFINGS MAY CONVEY THE ILLUSION OF CONSULTATION, BUT NOT THE SUBSTANCE. IN SALT II THE COUNSEL OF THE ALLIANCE AS AN INSTITUTION WILL BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND THERE ARE MANY OF US WHO WILL VIEW WITH GREAT INTEREST THE CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH INCREASED EUROPEAN ATTENTION AND STUDY WILL YIELD.

SALT AND THE U.S. CONGRESS

20. I HOPE THAT I WILL BE FORGIVEN FOR SAYING THAT, IN MY VIEW. ONE OF THE MOST HELPFUL DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO SALT II WAS THE OVERWHELMING SUPPORT GIVEN BY THE CONGRESS TO MY AMENDMENT TO THE RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST HERE IS THE FACT THAT THE CONGRESS SPECIFICALLY SUSTAINED THE VIEW THAT THE TREATY TO BE NEGOTIATED ON OFFENSIVE ARMS IN SALT II SHOULD BE BASED ON A NUMERICAL BALANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, EXCLUSIVE OF ANY U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE.

21. AS SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES MAY KNOW, WE HAD A LENGTHY DEBATE IN THE SENATE OVER THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE AS OUTLINED IN MY AMENDMENT. EVERY EFFORT TO INCLUDE OUR EUROPEAN FORCE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WAS VOTED DOWN, AND BY A SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN. THE SUPPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE WAS INVALUABLE IN ACCOMPLISHING THE CLEAR DECLARATION IN MY AMENDMENT WHICH CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT TO ASSURE THAT IN ANY FUTURE TREATY THEY UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO LEVELS OF INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC FORCES IN-

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FERIOR TO THE LEVELS GRANTED TO THE SOVIET UNION. THESE SENATE GUIDELINES WERE LATER CONFIRMED BY A VOTE OF 307-4 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SIGNED INTO LAW BY THE PRESIDENT.

22. TO ME, THIS IS A HOPEFUL SIGN THAT THE LESSONS OF SALT I ARE ALREADY BEING LEARNED. WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO BE TOUGHER, MORE DETERMINED, AND MORE ATTENTIVE.

23. THERE IS ONE ADDITIONAL POINT THAT SHOULD BE MADE. THE CONGRESS' CALL FOR EQUALITY IN SALT II -- AN EQUALITY BASED ON NUMBERS AND THROW WEIGHT OF INTERCONTINENTAL SYSTEMS -- IS BEST UNDERSTOOD AS A PRESCRIPTION FOR SCALING DOWN THE LEVEL OF ARMAMENT ON BOTH SIDES. WE SHOULD ENTER SALT II SEEKING EQUALITY WITH PROPOSALS TO REDUCE STRATEGIC FORCES, PARTICULARLY DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS SUCH AS THE SS-9 AND ITS EVEN LARGER SUCCESSOR.

24. GUARANTEEING THE WEST'S SECURITY REQUIRES IMAGINATION, INGENUITY, AND INTELLIGENCE. NO COUNTRY HAS A MONOPOLY ON THESE VIRTUES. THAT IS WHY THE RESOURCES OF THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE MUST BE MARSHALED. THE UNITED STATES STANDS READY TO CONSULT, TO PLAN JOINTLY, AND TO COLLABORATE ON THE CRUCIAL MATTERS WHICH AFFECT THE STRENGTH AND SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE AND, THEREFORE, THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.

END TEXT.HILLENBRAND

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